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Secretary briefed White House, LA and OAS Ambassadors

October 28, 5:00 p.m. on latest Cuban developments. Texts exchanges notes ~~Kennedy~~ Kennedy, Khrushchev and UNSYG distributed. Secretary made following points:

1. Of Khrushchev's three messages, October 26 letter (not distributed or made public), though long, vague and troubled gave clear indication USSR prepared withdraw weapons. October 27 letter, by offering Turkey-Cuba trade, made impossible connection between two unrelated situations and proposed deal which would have endangered EUR security in exchange Cuba. October 28 letter states instructions given dismantle missiles and return them USSR under UN verification. US rejected Turkey-Cuba trade in President press statement October 27, but US replying

positively

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S/S - Mrs. Davis

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positively other two letters. (We not basing any policy on Castro's broadcast today of five main points. Indeed, re his reference to evacuation of Guantánamo, any such trade will be even more difficult at present with Castro regime in Cuba ~~than~~ than any trade involving ~~Turkey~~ Turkey.)

2. However, US remains cautious. Problem far from ~~be~~ solved yet. Kuznetsov on way NY with contents brief case unknown. Khrushchev could send new note tomorrow taking different tack. Moreover, can be serious ~~pr~~ problems re implementation actual withdrawal and verification. Important we all refrain any acts or statements which might ~~z~~ make more ~~f~~ difficult actual withdrawal weapons.

3. Nothing US has or will say or do will alter in any way our joint responsibilities with OARs re defense hemisphere. US has not and will not (rpt not) commit ourselves to anything that would jeopardize interests OARs or OAS/OC. Re problem invasion Cuba, this issue has arisen only because of introduction offensive weapons. Removal weapons removes occasion for attack. However, President's statement re no invasion does not (rpt not) mean we guaranteeing Castro regime. Nor do we intend give Castro any freedom action interfere internal affairs OARs. Rio Treaty and Resolutions 6th AMM still valid. Cuban problem will probably still remain after removal weapons.

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weapons, including efforts subversion, indirect aggression, etc. In response question, Secretary promised make foregoing point ~~much~~ publicly clear but exact timing and means will need to be determined.

4. Quarantine will continue until UN inspection and verification arrangements are worked out and functioning. However, we do not (rpt not) expect this will produce ~~and~~ incidents since 16 Soviet bloc ships (including some we particularly interested in) already turned back and others are long way from quarantine zone.

5. In these negotiations US has made no deals, no unknown transactions, no understandings ~~x~~ behind scenes. Everything contained in texts distributed.

6. Next immediate steps up to UNSYG to move promptly to ensure actual removal weapons. He planning travel Cuba October 30 ~~continue~~ with large expert staff. We will ~~continue~~ keep OARs fully informed developments and we can jointly decide when appropriate moment comes for further COAS/OS formal action.

7. Hemisphere solidarity as reflected October 23 resolution has made magnificent contribution world peace; has been key and critical element whole situation and has made deep impression

throughout

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throughout situation. Situation could have resulted in most serious possible consequences if caution not ~~has~~ been exercised both sides.

End.

RUSK

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